The ontology of metaphysics is so embedded in the way we think, so coiled within the very language that we must use, so protected, that we cannot get at it by a frontal approach.
It is necessary to dwell in an author’s work to grasp the underlying ontological principles at work.
In the between-two of quantum field entanglement – their belonging-together – world is unfolded. World is a concretion transparently disclosed out of the enfolded orders in the case of dual mode match. The brain’s supreme achievement is to bring this match in the between-two under exquisite control. The transparent process of becoming in which world appears, both waking and dreaming, is the belonging-together of dual ontological modes described as quantum thermofield brain dynamics.
World is not a persisting substance under efficient causality but instead world-thrownness is continually gifted in the transparent dynamical operation of the brain’s between-two. The thermofield “ground” of this process is “abground”.
The Transparent Becoming of World, Gordon G. Globus
The ‘scheme’ at work in Globus’ philosophical construction must be used, as he himself says, to “unflinchingly explore our interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme”. Since the scheme retains neither transcendental realism nor even the entangled agential realism of a Karen Barad, say, (which given its focus on quantum entanglement is something that needs to be confronted, each from each) the consistency of world-thrownness between Dasein and others has to be accounted for. The parallel concretions of world-thrownness must also confront and be confronted by the parallax scheme of Žižek.
The first problematic is that of the notion of abground, hardly itself a transparent word, coined as it is from the German abgrund familiar to readers of Heidegger’s later works, particularly vom Ereignis. That Ereignis itself is implicated in the irruption from the abground of accomplishable possibilities means a fuller look at Heidegger, particularly the Heidegger of Malabou’s “The Heidegger (Ex) Change”, which brings up the difficulty already inherent in quantum field entanglement, but made more acute by Heidegger’s work, of the continuation of certain invariants in Globus scheme, invariants that for the Heidegger Exchange cannot be invariant if metaphysics Is to be truly ‘set in its place’. Globus is aware of the danger of the ‘obviousness’ of metaphysical assumptions embedded in our understanding and language, one has to be a ‘master of suspicion’ in the Nietzschean sense to avoid falling into its wiles.
The second problematic is that world-thrownness must, in terms of supporting the notion of abground and Ereignis, be world-historical-thrownness. The world-historical nature of metaphysics itself: it’s intertwining with history in general; with the history of Spirit in Hegel’s sense; with the history of currency as the last god; all these must be brought into play as to how the brain or neurological system as a whole can reflect and encompass a history that, while not arbitrary, leaves no room for shortcuts such as ascribing some sort of genotypic/phenotypic similarity to account for the embedding of that history in the world-thrownness it discloses precisely as the historical determinations of the Self, which as such is the same as World, but narrated differently. If Globus’ parallel concretion withstands Žižek’s alternate, primarily from, The Parallax View and Less Than Nothing, it still must survive the narrative conception of Joyce and Beckett.
The third problematic is that world-thrownness doesn’t appear to confront or challenge the subjectivity of the I-Subject, the Janus-headed nature of the I-Subject that intimates a correspondence with the site of The Heidegger (Ex) Change” itself. That subjectivity that Žižek is so keen to hang on to as a revolutionary a priori.
The last problematic (that I can project before treating each and allowing each treatment to inform the others) is related to the first, in that whether brain science, whether quantum or not, and even if it manages to shake off the notion of the brain as an information processing computer, seeing it instead as a sort of ontological world-generator, retains too much of Cartesian/Newtonian physicalism and materialism, whether in naming the generator as brain Globus isn’t surreptitiously subscribing to the brain as primarily physical and material, and whether the de-materialization of matter itself in quantum mechanics is taken consistently enough that “brain” no longer means some sort of material substance. And in the latter case, precisely what is meant by “brain” and why does Globus insist on giving it primacy, at least as far as naming, if the goal is to nullify the separation of mind/brain by showing its duality to be entangled, and therefore not dual in the sense of coming-together and breaking-apart but as belonging-together such that each implies the other (though not as a necessary implication, an implication of possibility).
ΚΑΛΟΎΝΤΟΣ ΤΑ ΜΗ ΌΝΤΑ 